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This paper explores the optimal interaction between the tax system
and unemployment compensation in insuring people against the risks of
involuntary unemployment and low ability. To that end, we introduce
search unemployment in a model of optimal non-linear income taxation.
We …nd that the optimal search subsidy (i.e. the di¤erence between the
in-work bene…t and the unemployment bene…t) increases if, for e¢cient
agents, the participation constraint (governing job search) becomes rel-
atively more important than the incentive compatibility constraint (de-
termining hours worked). The relation between unemployment bene…ts
and the optimal level of in-work bene…ts (the number of people exerting
positive work e¤ort) is U (inversely U) shaped.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent years many industrialized countries have employed tax policies to
encourage unemployed persons to seek work, thereby reducing expenditures on
welfare and unemployment bene…ts. Following the example of the United States,
several European countries have introduced or are considering in-work tax ben-
e…ts in the form of an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC). More generally,
by lowering taxes on low skilled work, governments increasingly encourage low
skilled workers to look for jobs. These policies are part of the so-called strategy
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1of ’welfare to work,’ where governments …ght poverty by raising employment for
low skilled workers rather than by increasing welfare bene…ts for these workers.
To investigate the optimal interaction between tax policies and welfare pay-
ments, we introduce unemployment risk due to search unemployment in a model
of optimal non-linear income taxation in which agents feature heterogeneous
abilities (similar to Mirrlees (1971)). In such a setting, unemployment bene…ts
are required to insure risk-averse agents against the risk of becoming unem-
ployed. At the same time, by redistributing between high skilled and low skilled
workers, a non-linear income tax protects the same risk-averse agents against the
risk of being born without many skills. Indeed, inequities originate in di¤erences
in not only abilities (as in Mirrlees (1971)) but also employment status.
In such a setting, we explore how the government can best address these
two dimensions of poverty: low skills and involuntary unemployment. Should
the government rely mainly on unemployment bene…ts rather than on in-work
bene…ts or may it be optimal to o¤er in-work bene…ts that exceed unemployment
bene…ts? Generous unemployment compensation helps those who are poorest
(i.e. the unemployed) but harms incentives to look for a job. In-work bene…ts
do not su¤er from this latter drawback, but are less well targeted at those most
in need.
In investigating this trade o¤, this paper arrives at the following main in-
sights. Whereas unemployment bene…ts distort agents’ job search (i.e. the par-
ticipation or extensive margin), in-work bene…ts for low-ability agents distort the
hours that agents choose to work (i.e. incentive compatibility or intensive mar-
gin) by making it more attractive for high-ability agents to mimic lower ability
agents. If the government can observe an agent’s ability, the incentive compati-
bility constraint (i.e. the intensive margin) can be ignored and the participation
constraint (i.e. extensive margin) is binding also for high-ability types. In that
case, in-work bene…ts tend to be generous. In fact, the government may …nd it
optimal to o¤er in-work bene…ts that exceed optimal unemployment bene…ts,
even though the unemployed are poorer than agents with a job. The reason is
that higher unemployment compensation is a relatively ine¤ective way to …ght
poverty because it bene…ts not only the poorest but also the richest agents. In
particular, if unemployment bene…ts are increased, the government must reduce
taxes on the most e¢cient agents in order to prevent these high-ability work-
ers from leaving the labor market. The associated adverse distributional e¤ect
of reducing taxes for the richest agents may outweigh the bene…t of reducing
poverty among the unemployed.
If the government cannot observe ability (so that it has to meet the incentive
compatibility constraint), in-work bene…ts should be smaller than optimal un-
employment compensation. Intuitively, the incentive compatibility constraint
rather than the participation constraint is binding for high-ability agents. In-
deed, the incentive compatibility constraint implies that utility increases with
ability so that the participation constraint is not binding for the richest agents.1
1This assumes that search costs are uniform for all agents. If search costs would increase
in ability, the participation constraint could be binding for high ability agents. We do not
2Accordingly, in order to prevent richer agents from mimicking poorer workers,
generous in-work bene…ts for poor workers force the government to reduce taxes
on richer workers. In this way, in-work bene…ts for poor agents also bene…t richer
agents and thus are a relatively ine¤ective way to …ght poverty. Rather than
using in-work bene…ts, the government therefore relies more on unemployment
bene…ts, which bene…t the poorest agents and do not directly harm the incen-
tives facing the richest and most e¢cient workers but only damage the search
incentives facing marginal workers.
We also explore the case in which the government can optimize only the tax
system and has to take unemployment compensation as given. This allows us
to investigate the interaction between the tax and social insurance systems by
considering the impact of an exogenously given unemployment bene…t on the
optimal tax system. The relationship between unemployment bene…ts and the
level of in-work bene…ts appears to be U-shaped. As unemployment bene…ts
are raised from a low initial level, unemployment bene…ts absorb the budgetary
room for generous in-work bene…ts as an instrument to …ght poverty. At low
unemployment compensation, unemployment bene…ts and in-work bene…ts are
thus substitutes in …ghting poverty. As unemployment bene…ts are increased
further, however, the participation constraint for marginal workers becomes
binding and the government needs to raise in-work bene…ts to draw people out
of unemployment into work. At high levels of unemployment bene…ts, there-
fore, in-work bene…ts and unemployment compensation become complements:
in-work bene…ts help to o¤set the impact of higher unemployment bene…ts on
the participation constraint. This U-shaped relationship between in-work bene-
…ts and unemployment compensation reveals that generous in-work bene…ts are
called for in both countries with low and high unemployment bene…ts, but for
di¤erent reasons. In countries with low unemployment compensation (such as
the United States), in-work bene…ts are aimed at poverty alleviation. In coun-
tries with high unemployment compensation (such as most Western European
countries), in contrast, in-work bene…ts protect the incentives to participate in
the labor market.
In introducing search unemployment in an optimal tax model, we focus on
the case in which the government can verify a worker’s ability. We adopt this
informational assumption for four main reasons. First, it allows us to explore
the arguments for in-work tax bene…ts in circumstances that are favorable to
these tax subsidies. As argued above, in-work bene…ts are most attractive if
the participation rather than the incentive compatibility constraint is binding
for high-ability agents. The second reason for our informational assumption is
that this allows us to clearly identify how search incentives restrict the abil-
ity of the government to redistribute resources away from the most e¢cient
workers towards agents with lower consumption levels. Without the intensive
decision margin (i.e. the selection of work e¤ort after having found a job) limit-
ing redistribution, only the search margin (i.e. the extensive decision margin or
consider this latter case because there is not much empirical support for search costs rising
with ability.
3participation constraint) constrains redistribution. A third reason for assuming
that types are observable is that it allows us to interpret high bene…ts for low-
ability households as disability bene…ts where the government tags low-ability
agents (see Akerlof (1978)). In this interpretation, the search costs can be in-
terpreted as the information costs associated with the government verifying the
ability level of these low-ability agents. The …nal reason for our informational
assumption is that it simpli…es the analysis and is a …rst step towards exploring
a more complex model in which the intensive and extensive margins interact
(see Boone and Bovenberg (2001)).
Our analysis is based on the special utility function studied by Ebert (1992).
In Ebert’s model, work e¤ort enters private utility in a linear fashion. This
implies that income e¤ects on consumption are absent and that the government
cares about the distribution of consumption rather than the distribution of work
e¤ort. Our approach is thus close to Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala (1994), who
note that policy debates focus on raising consumption rather than reducing the
work e¤ort (or increasing leisure) of the poor. Kanbur, Keen and Tuomala
(1994), however, adopt a non-welfarist social welfare function. We, in contrast,
continue to follow the welfarist tradition, but assume a special, quasi-linear
utility function. Another reason for adopting this particular utility function is
that it clearly illustrates the importance of the search margin in constraining the
redistributive powers of the government. In the absence of the search margin,
the government engages in extreme redistribution if it can observe worker’s
ability: only the most e¢cient worker exerts work e¤ort, as the distribution of
work is determined by e¢ciency rather than equity considerations. We show
how the search margin prevents this extremely redistributive policy.
We study issues similar to those explored by Saez (2000), who incorpo-
rates two labor-supply margins in an optimal tax model, namely not only hours
worked (as in the traditional model) but also the participation decision. He calls
these two margins the intensive and extensive margins, respectively. Although
the search margin in our model resembles the extensive margin in the model of
Saez, our model is quite di¤erent from Saez’ approach. First of all, in the Saez
’model, agents voluntarily choose not to participate in the labor market while
in our model, in contrast, agents are exposed to the risk of being involuntarily
unemployed. Indeed, whereas in our model the unemployed feature the same
tastes as employed agents, Saez (2000) assumes that the agents who are not
employed exhibit a higher preference for leisure than the agents who are em-
ployed. Hence, within the Saez framework with voluntary unemployment, the
arguments for providing a bene…t to agents without employment are consider-
ably weaker than in our setting with involuntary unemployment; in Saez’ model,
a person’s unemployment status is entirely his or her own responsibility, while
in our model it may be the result of bad luck. Our framework thus allows us to
explore the optimal interaction between categorical unemployment bene…ts and
non-linear income taxes as instruments to insure agents against the risk of not
only low ability but also involuntary unemployment.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. After Section 2 formulates
the model, section 3 sets up the optimization problem for the government and
4discusses the optimality conditions. Subsequently, section 4 explores optimal
tax policy if welfare bene…ts b are exogenously set. We can interpret this case
as the tax authorities optimizing the tax system, taking the welfare system as
given. The case in which the government can simultaneously optimize the tax
and welfare systems is investigated in Section 5. In this section we also show that
in-work bene…ts are less attractive if the government cannot observe workers’
type. Section 6 concludes. All proofs of the results are in the appendix.
2M o d e l
Consider an economy with agents who feature homogenous preferences but het-
erogeneous skills. A worker of ability (or skill or e¢ciency level) n working y
hours (or providing y units of work e¤ort) supplies ny e¢ciency units of homo-
geneous labor. With a linear production function featuring a constant unitary
labor productivity, these e¢ciency units are transformed in the same number of
units of output. We select output as the numeraire. Hence, the before-tax wage
per hour is given by the exogenous parameter n: Overall gross output (or gross
income) z(n) amounts to z(n) ´ ny(n): The density of agents of ability n is de-
noted by f(n); while F(n) represents the corresponding cumulative distribution
function. The support of the distribution of abilities is given by [n0;n 1].
Workers feature homogeneous tastes. In particular, they share the following
quasi-linear utility function over consumption x and hours worked (or work
e¤ort) y
u(x;y)=v(x) ¡ y;
where v0 (x) > 0;v00 (x) < 0 for all x ¸ 0 while limx#0 v0 (x)=1 and limx¡!+1v0 (x)=
0. The concavity of v(:) implies that agents are risk averse and thus want to
obtain insurance against the risks of unemployment and low earning capacity
n. The speci…c cardinalization of the utility function a¤ects the distributional
preferences of a utilitarian government. In particular, the social planner wants
to insure agents both against the risk of becoming unemployed and against the
risk of being born with low ability. In other words, the concavity of v(:) implies
that a utilitarian government aims to …ght poverty of both unemployed and
low-ability agents.
As in Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Weymark (1987) and the example in Ebert
(1992), work e¤ort y enters the utility function in a linear fashion. This has two
major consequences. First, consumption x is not a¤ected by income e¤ects.
A higher average tax rate thus induces households to work more rather than
facing a lower level of consumption. Second, a utilitarian government cares only
about overall work e¤ort and not about the distribution of that work e¤ort over
the various agents. Such a government thus aims at an equal distribution of
consumption (i.e. the alleviation of poverty) rather than an equal distribution
of welfare.
Instead of working with work e¤ort y(n) and consumption x(n) as the in-
struments of the worker, we …nd it more convenient to write the utility function
5in terms of gross income (or output) z(n) ´ ny(n) and net income (or consump-
tion) x(n): Utility of type n is then written as u(n) ´ v(x(n)) ¡ z(n)=n:
Agents have to search for a job. In particular, by searching with intensity
s 2 [0;1]; agents …nd a job with probability s:2 Search costs °(s) are given by
°(s)=
½
°s if s 2 [0;¹ s]
+1 otherwise,
where ¹ s<1 captures the idea that agents can fail to …nd a job, even if they
search at full capacity ¹ s. Hence, in contrast to Saez (2000), agents are exposed
to the risk of becoming involuntarily unemployed. If an agent does not succeed
in …nding a job in our one-period model, (s)he receives an unemployment bene…t
b ¸ 0; which the agent takes as given. Since the government cannot observe the
ability of unemployed agents, the unemployment bene…t does not depend on n:
An agent of ability n thus selects search intensity s to maximize expected utility
U(n)=m a x
s f¡°(s)+su(n)+( 1¡ s)v(b)g:
Substituting in here the search cost function ° (s) introduced above, one can
easily verify that the optimal choice of s for type n amounts to
s(n)=
½
0 if u(n) <°+ v(b)
¹ s if u(n) ¸ ° + v(b): (1)
The government has to meet its budget constraint
Z n1
n0
f (n)s(n)[b + T (n)]dn = g + b; (2)
where g represents the exogenously given government expenditure and T (n)=
z (n) ¡ x(n) denotes the tax paid by type n: The utilitarian government max-
imizes ex-ante expected utility (i.e. expected utility before ability and labor





f (n)[¡°s(n)+s(n)u(n)+( 1¡ s(n))v(b)]dn: (3)
In optimizing the objective function, the government is able to verify a per-
son’s ability n after that person has found a job. As long as a person remains
unemployed, however, the government cannot observe the ability of a person.
By …nding a job, a person thus reveals his ability. The government can observe
the productivity of an agent only if that agent participates in the production
process. Hence, in contrast to unemployment insurance, the tax system can
discriminate across types. Since a worker’s ability n is veri…able, high-ability
workers cannot mimic low-ability workers. The government therefore does not
2This formalization of the search margin in a static framework is similar to the one-period
search model in Hosios (1990).
6have to meet the incentive compatibility constraint associated with the intensive
margin of labor supply (i.e. work e¤ort or hours worked). This increases the
scope for redistribution within the group of workers: taxes on labor income can
be progressive without hurting the incentives of high-ability workers to exert
e¤ort in their jobs.
Without the intensive decision margin (i.e. the selection of work e¤ort y
after having found a job) constraining redistribution, only the search margin
(i.e. the extensive decision margin) limits the ability of the government to
redistribute resources away from the most e¢cient workers towards agents with
lower consumption levels. Whereas high-ability workers are not able to mimic
the low-ability workers by reducing their work e¤ort y, they can mimic the
low-skilled unemployed by reducing search e¤ort s and remaining unemployed.
Hence, the optimal unemployment insurance and tax systems have to meet the
participation constraint u(n) ¸ v(b)+° in order to induce type n to look for a
job. High-ability types search for work only if they can …nd a job (which reveals
their identity) yielding a utility level that is at least as large as that enjoyed
when refraining from search and remaining unemployed (and thus saving on
search costs and hiding ability). With the government able to verify the ability
of workers, the extensive rather than the intensive margin binds for high-ability
agents. This contrasts with the case in which the government cannot observe
a worker’s type (see below). In that case, the search constraint is binding only
for the marginal (i.e. the least e¢cient worker), nw: With non-veri…able types,
if the participation constraint is met for the marginal type nw, the incentive
compatibility constraint (which implies that the utility of workers rises with
type) ensures that the participation constraint is met also for more e¢cient
types n>n w:3
Summarizing, compared to the unemployment compensation, the tax system
is a relatively e¢cient instrument to redistribute resources to low-ability workers
because it can employ more information, namely the worker’s type. Whereas
unemployment compensation cannot be di¤erentiated across various types (i.e.
b cannot depend on type n); the tax authorities observe a worker’s type and can
thus di¤erentiate in-work bene…ts across types (i.e. the average tax rate T(n)
may depend on n):
3 The optimal tax problem
This section introduces the main ingredients for characterizing the optimal tax
schedule if the government cannot observe agents’ search e¤ort but does observe
the ability of workers. We …rst rewrite the government’s optimization problem
by using two observations. First, due to the linearity of the cost function ° (s);
3With veri…able worker’s types, applying a work test (by observing search) is most valuable
for the most e¢cient types. Indeed, relaxing the participation constraint of these types yields
the largest social bene…ts. With non-observable worker’s types, in contrast, the government
would like to apply the work test (and thus observe search) only for the marginal worker nw
because this is the only worker for which the search margin binds.
7an agent should either search full time ¹ s or not at all (i.e. s =0 ) . Second,
the highest ability types should work and therefore search for a job because
these types are most e¢cient and thus feature the lowest labor costs. These two
observations imply that the government selects a marginal type nw 2 [n0;n 1]
such that types n<n w do not search, while all types n ¸ nw search at full
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=0
for the government budget constraint, where ´(n) and ¸E represent the La-
grange multipliers for the participation constraint and the government budget
constraint, respectively.
The …rst-order condition for maximizing (4) with respect to consumption








for types n ¸ nw.T h es h a d o wv a l u e´(n) on the left-hand side of this expression
captures the gain from raising consumption of type n in terms of relaxing the
participation constraint of that type. The right-hand side stands for the direct
distributional loss of raising consumption of type n: This loss is directly related
to the di¤erence between the marginal cost of producing additional resources
(i.e. the marginal utility value of government revenue) ¸E and the marginal
bene…t of shifting resources to type n in terms of marginal utility of consumption
of that type, v0 (x(n)): This expression thus formalizes the trade o¤ between
e¢ciency considerations (i.e. providing incentives to search for jobs) and equity
8considerations (i.e. redistributing resources away from those with a relatively
high consumption level (so that v0 (x(n)) <¸ E) to those with lower consumption
levels).
Turning to the optimal level of before-tax income z(n); we observe that the
optimization problem (4) is linear in z (n) with coe¢cient
©
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The optimal z (n) is therefore determined as follows4










z (n)=0 if ¹ sf (n)+´(n) >¸ Ef (n)¹ sn: (6)
In order to interpret these results, we rewrite the condition ¹ sf (n)+´(n) >
¸Ef (n)¹ sn as 1
n >v 0 (x(n)) (by using expression (5) to eliminate ´(n)).A g e n t
n exerting more work e¤ort yields additional consumption for agent n,w h i c h
is valued at v0 (x(n)),b u tc o s t s 1
n in terms of disutility of work e¤ort. Hence,
1
n >v 0 (x(n)) implies that the costs of work exceed the marginal bene…ts so
that work e¤ort should be reduced to its minimum level of zero.
The …rst-order condition for maximizing (4) with respect to the least e¢cient
type that searches for a job (the so-called marginal searcher), nw; amounts to
¹ sf (nw)
½
v(b)+° ¡ v(x(nw)) +
z (nw)
nw




w h e r ew eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a tt h eo p t i m a lnw is not a corner solution (i.e. nw >
n0; we return to possibility of a corner solution below). The direct utility
gain from having the marginal type search for a job (i.e. v (x(nw)) ¡
z(nw)
nw ¡
v(b) ¡ °) should equal the costs in terms of government revenue (i.e. the net
search subsidy ¡T(n) ¡ b, which is de…ned as the in-work tax bene…t x(nw) ¡
z(nw)=¡T(nw) net of the unemployment bene…t b): In other words, at the
marginal searching type nw, the private bene…t of search (i.e. v(x(nw)) ¡
z(nw)
nw ¡ v(b) ¡ ° = u(nw) ¡ v(b) ¡ °) should equal the social cost of the search
subsidy ¡(T(nw)+b) (or the net subsidy on work) in terms of the government
budget constraint.
3.1 The optimal tax system without search
In order to understand the impact of the search margin on the optimal tax
system, this sub-section explores the case in which the search margin is absent
(i.e. ´(n)=0 ). In that case, expressions (5) and (6) imply that all work should
be performed by the most e¢cient type n1 so that marginal production costs
¸E are determined by the marginal labor costs of this type, i.e. ¸E =1 =n1: All
4We cannot have ¡¹ sf (n) 1
n + ¸Ef (n)¹ s ¡ ´(n) 1
n > 0 because that would imply
(by the linearity of z (:) in the optimization problem) z (n)=+ 1 so that z (n) >
n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)): This, however, would violate the participation constraint. see also
sub-section 3.1.
9t y p e sf e a t u r et h es a m ec o n s u m p t i o nl e v e l¹ x determined by v0(¹ x)=¸E =1 =n1:
Intuitively, given the linear speci…cation of the disutility of work e¤ort c(y)=y,
e¢ciency rather than equity considerations determine the distribution of work
e¤ort. Hence, all labor should be performed by the most e¢cient workers, i.e.
the workers of type n1: In contrast to the distribution of work e¤ort, the distri-
bution of consumption a¤ects social utility in view of the concave nature of the
utility of consumption v(x): In particular, the government prefers an equal dis-
tribution of consumption, with the uniform consumption level being determined
by the costs of supplying labor by the most e¢cient type n1 (i.e v0(¹ x)=1 =n1):
Whereas the distribution of consumption is thus equal, the distribution of util-
ity is highly unequal as the most e¢cient workers perform all work. Indeed,
the government levies a highly progressive tax T(n1) on these types, inducing
these workers to produce su¢cient resources for providing a consumption level
¹ x to all other agents. The non-negative tax level T(n1) is determined (from the
government budget constraint (2)) by the costs of granting tax subsidies (i.e.
¡T(n)=¹ x) to all types n<n 1: The tax level T(n1) thus declines with the
share of most e¢cient types in the population.
This paper assumes that the government cannot verify search. In that case,
the search margin prevents the government from shifting all work e¤ort to the
most e¢cient type. In particular, having the most e¢cient type perform all
work e¤ort would make it unattractive for this type to look for such a demand-
ing job. In this way, the participation constraint u(n) ¸ v(b)+° prevents
the government from exploiting the most e¢cient types through an extremely
redistributive tax system. Hence, work e¤ort must be distributed more equally
over the population.
4 The optimal tax system with search
In characterizing the optimal tax system with endogenous search, we distinguish
three separate cases. To do so, we de…ne ^ n as the least e¢cient type that searches
for a job (i.e. u(^ n) ¸ v(b)+°) without a net search subsidy (or subsidy on work).
The appendix shows that ^ n is the biggest root to the equation ³° (:;b)=0 ; that
is,














where x(n) is determined by v0 (x(n)) = 1
n.T o s e e t h a t ^ n is just productive
enough to search for a job without government help in the form of a work subsidy
5This expression follows from expression (7) and a number of additional results that are
established in the appendix (e.g., z(nw)=0and ¸E =1 =^ n):
10¡(T(^ n)+b) > 0; we note that v(x(^ n)) ¡ v(b) ¡ ° + 1
^ n (¡x(^ n)+b)=0can be
written as (using T(^ n)=z(^ n) ¡ x(^ n))
v(b)+° = v(x(^ n)) ¡
z (^ n) ¡ T (^ n) ¡ b
^ n
An in-work bene…t ¡T (^ n)=b that exactly o¤sets the impact of the unemploy-
ment bene…t b on search incentives makes this type ^ n indi¤erent about searching




Accordingly, types n>^ n search for a job even if the government does not
subsidize search. Less e¢cient types n<^ n, in contrast, must be paid a search
subsidy to induce them to look for a job.
In order to de…ne the three separate cases, we relate ^ n; which does not
depend on the density function f (:) and its support [n0;n 1]; to the distribution
of skills in the following de…nition.
De…nition 1 For given b and °, an economy is characterized by the density
function f (:) and its support [n0;n 1]. W ed e … n ear i c h[ R ] ,ap o o r[ P ]a n da
normal [N] economy as follows:
[R]
R n1
^ n f (n)¹ s(n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)) ¡ x(n)+b)dn+
R ^ n




^ n f (n)¹ s(n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)) ¡ x(n)+b)dn < b + g and
[N] there exists nw 2 [n0; ^ n] such that
R n1
^ n f (n)¹ s(n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)) ¡ x(n)+b)dn+
R ^ n
nw f (n)¹ s(¡x(^ n)+b)dn = b + g;
where x(n) is determined by v0 (x(n)) = 1
n and ^ n is de…ned in equation (8).
In the rich economy, the government enjoys a budget surplus if the gov-
ernment taxes all workers of type n>^ n to the maximum amount without
discouraging them from …nding a job (z (n)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)))a n du s -
ing the proceeds for three purposes, namely, to pay, …rst, exogenous government
spending g; second, unemployment bene…ts to the part of the population 1 ¡ ¹ s
that remains unemployed even though it has searched for a job; and third, in-
work tax bene…ts to all other workers n<^ n so that these workers enjoy the
same consumption level as the marginal worker of type ^ n without having to
exert any work e¤ort (i.e. ¡T(n)=x(^ n) >bfor n<^ n):
In the poor economy, in contrast, the maximum amount of tax from all types
n>^ n yields less revenue than needed to …nance, in addition to government
spending g; a consumption level of only b (rather than ¹ x>b ) to all other
agents. The normal economy occupies an intermediate position between the
rich and the poor economies. In this economy, the maximum tax revenue that
can be extracted from the types n>^ n allows the government to provide a
relatively high consumption level x(^ n)=T(n) >bto only a subset of types
[n0; ^ n] while paying a lower consumption level b to the remaining types.
In order to establish the link between the unemployment bene…t b and the
three cases de…ned above, we …rst need to rule out the uninteresting case in
11which government spending g is so high that the economy is poor even without
unemployment bene…ts (i.e. b =0 ) .




f (n)¹ s(n(v(x(n)) ¡ °) ¡ x(n))dn;
where ^ n is de…ned in equation (8).
Using this de…nition of the maximal government expenditure that can be
…nanced in the absence of unemployment bene…ts, we can prove the following
result.
Lemma 3 Assume that g<g ¤ (°) then there exist values b;¹ b satisfying 0 ·
b · ¹ b<+1 such that
b 2 [0;bi implies that the economy is rich,
b 2 [b;¹ b] implies that the economy is normal,
b>¹ b implies that the economy is poor.
At high levels of unemployment compensation, the economy is poor. Lower-
ing unemployment bene…ts eventually turns the economy into a normal one and
a large enough cut in unemployment compensation makes the economy rich.
We can now formulate the solution to the optimization problem (4) with an
exogenous level of unemployment compensation b as follows.
Proposition 4 The optimal solution has the following form for the three cases
[R], [P] and [N]:
[R] there exist nz 2h n0;n 1i such that
for n 2 [n0;n zi; i ti st h ec a s et h a ts(n)=¹ s; z (n)=0 ;x(n)=¹ x; and v0 (¹ x)=
1
nz,
for n 2h nz;n 1]; i ti st h ec a s et h a ts(n)=¹ s; z (n)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b));
and v0 (x(n)) = 1
n,
where nz is determined by the government budget constraint
Z n1
nz










[P] this economy unravels as the government cannot pay the unemployment
bene…ts b and its exogenous revenue requirement g;
[N] there exist nz ¸ nw ¸ n0 such that
for n 2 [n0;n wi; i ti st h ec a s et h a ts(n)=0 ,
12for n 2 [nw;n zi; it is the case that s(n)=¹ s; z (n)=0 ;x(n)=¹ x and v0 (¹ x)= 1
nz,
for n 2h nz;n 1]; i ti st h ec a s et h a ts(n)=¹ s; z (n)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b));
v0 (x(n)) = 1
n,
where nz is determined by
nz =^ n
with ^ n de…ned in (8), nw is determined by the government budget constraint
Z n1
nz
f (n)¹ s(z (n) ¡ x(n)+b)dn +
Z nz
nw






Remark 5 T h ec h o i c eo ft h ei n t e r v a l[nw;n zi in the solution for the nor-
mal economy above is somewhat arbitrary. Any other (set of) subinterval(s)
of [n0;n zi with the same mass of agents is a solution as well. However, the
solution above is the most natural choice.
Corollary 6 In the normal economy T (n)+b>0 for all n 2h nz;n 1];
limn#nz [T (n)+b]=0 6 and T (n)+b = ¡¹ x + b<0 for all n 2 [nw;n zi;
In the rich economy T (n)+b>0 for all n 2h nz;n 1]; limn#nz [T (n)+b] > 0
and T (n)+b = ¡¹ x + b<0 for all n 2 [n0;n zi
We …rst discuss the properties of the solution that hold in both the rich and
normal economies before we turn to the properties that di¤er across these two
economies. In both the rich and normal economies, a set of agents optimally
search for a job (and pay search costs in the process) even though they do not
exert any e¤ort in their jobs (i.e. z(n)=0 )7. The reason why costly search for
a job is optimal even though workers do not produce anything is that workers
reveal their ability if they …nd a job. This additional information has social value
because it allows the government to better target its policy instruments aimed
at poverty alleviation at the less e¢cient, most deserving, types by providing
in-work bene…ts that are explicitly aimed at these types. In-work bene…ts are a
relatively e¢cient means to …ght poverty because, in contrast to unemployment
compensation, these bene…ts do not harm the search incentives of the more
e¢cient types and therefore do not reduce the rents that can be extracted from
these latter types. Jobs are thus an e¤ective way to get less able people out of
poverty even though these agents do not produce anything in their jobs. The
6We consider the limit n # nz h e r eb e c a u s ew i t ha na t o m l e s sd i s t r i b u t i o no ft y p e s ,z (nz)
and T (nz) are not uniquely determined.
7The reader may wonder why the government cannot observe the ability of unemployed
agents but does observe the ability of employed agents working zero hours. The point is that
these agents work ">0 hours but that the government minimizes " so that it can just uncover
a worker’s type. We in fact assume that " is in…nitely small.
13relative e¢cacy of in-work bene…ts as a poverty …ghting instrument compared
to unemployment bene…ts explains why a search subsidy (i:e: T(n)+b<0) is
optimal for some people (although these people do not provide work e¤ort if
their job search is successful).
We can interpret the jobs in which agents do not produce anything (i.e.
z(n)=0 )as disability insurance.8 In this interpretation, the search costs cor-
respond to the costs of uncovering the information about the ability level of
low-ability agents n<n z: Indeed, it does not matter for the optimal allocation
whether the costs of tagging these agents are paid by the government directly
or indirectly (i.e. by having to pay agents a su¢ciently high in-work bene…t
to induce these agents to search for a job). We thus can interpret the search
subsidies as disability bene…ts. In that interpretation, it seems most natural to
provide these bene…ts to the agents with the lowest ability rather than the more
able agents [nw;n zi:
The marginal (labor) cost of production ¸E is determined by the cost of labor
of the marginal worker nz, i.e. by the least e¢cient type that works positive
hours so that ¸E =1 =nz. The cost of additional resources thus exceeds that
in an economy without a search margin where ¸E = 1
n1 (see the discussion in
sub-section 3.1). Intuitively, in the presence of a search margin, the government
can less easily exploit the most e¢cient types. It therefore has to rely on less
e¢cient types to supply marginal output so that marginal labor costs increase.
The distributional wedge (i.e. the di¤erence between the marginal utility of
additional consumption and the marginal direct resource cost of that consump-
tion, v0(x(n)) ¡ ¸E) is negative for all workers who work positive hours (since
v0(x(n)) = 1=n < ¸E =1 =nz for n>n z). The government would thus like to
take resources away from the more e¢cient workers who feature a relatively high
consumption level but does not do so because this would harm the incentives of
these e¢cient workers to look for a job.9
The agents who collect search subsidies ¡(T(n)+b) > 0 feature a zero distri-
butional wedge (i.e. v0(x(n)) = v0(¹ x)=¸E) because providing in-work bene…ts
do not imply any direct distortions on the decision of the more e¢cient types.
Since the government does not have to worry about the more e¢cient workers
mimicing these less e¢cient workers, it can provide generous in-work bene…ts to
less able workers that makes these workers better o¤ than more able workers.
Hence, the tax system can be rather redistributive. The absence of the intensive
margin explains also why the work e¤ort decision is not distorted: workers do
not exert any work e¤ort if and only if the direct costs of additional produc-
tion in terms of work e¤ort 1=n exceed the bene…ts of additional production
¸E (and the bene…ts of addition production in terms of additional consumption
8Another interpretation of these jobs is workfare for agents who are not productive enough
to earn high wages in the private sector. High ability agents are not eligible for these jobs.
9Whereas the distributional wedge for those who provide positive work e¤ort is negative,
the corresponding wedge for the unemployed is positive (since v(¹ x) ¡ zz = v (b)+° (from
the participation constraint of the marginal worker nz) implies that b<¹ x and hence v0(b) >
v0(¹ x)=¸E):
14v0(x(n)).10
4.1 The normal economy
We now turn to results that are speci…c to the cases distinguished in de…nition
1, starting with the results for the normal economy. The normal economy
cannot a¤ord to pay search subsidies to all types [n0; ^ ni that are not productive
enough to look for a job without search subsidies. As a result, a subset of these
types [n0;n wi is not paid in-work tax bene…ts so they do not search and remain
unemployed.11 In a normal economy, therefore, the tax system (by paying in-
work tax bene…ts) cannot fully protect less able agents against poverty. Also
unemployment compensation plays a role in insuring agents against the risk of
being born with low ability n: The utility level of the low-ability agents who do
not search [n0;n wi corresponds to that enjoyed by the most productive types
hnz;n 1] who have found jobs in which they exert positive work e¤ort.12 For
these most e¢cient types, the average tax level T(n) (which determines the
production level z (n)) is selected so that these types are indi¤erent between
searching for job and staying unemployed (i.e. u(n) ¡ ° = v(b)):
The subset [nw;n zi who are paid in-work bene…ts ¡T(n) >bwithout having
to exert any e¤ort in their jobs enjoy the highest utility level of all types.13
Corollary 6 shows that x(n) ¡ b>0 for n 2 [nw;n zi: Substituting the Taylor
expansion v(b)=v(¹ x)+v0(¹ x)(b¡¹ x)+1=2v00(»)(b¡¹ x)2 (and noting that v0(¹ x)=
1=^ n)) into (9), we …nd that ° = ¡1=2v00(»)(¹ x¡b)2: Hence, in deciding whether
to give one more search subsidy and thus relying more on the tax system rather
than unemployment bene…ts in …ghting poverty, the government faces a trade
o¤ between saving on the costs of search ° a n d… g h t i n gp o v e r t yb yr e d u c i n gt h e
cost of unequal consumption level (which are directly related to concavity of
utility v(:)): Large search costs ° imply that the agents have to pay relatively
large costs to reveal their type by …nding a job.14 This makes the tax system a
relatively expensive instrument to redistribute resources: relatively large search
10The extreme result that work e¤ort rises discontinuously at type nz is due to the linear
speci…cation of the disutility of work e¤ort c(y)=y: If c(:) were convex, it would be optimal
to allocate work e¤ort more equally over the population without discontinuous jumps in work
e¤ort.
11The optimal nw in a normal economy is not the corner solution n0 so that (7) holds with
equality.
12The consumption level of the unemployed, however, is lower than that of the more pro-
ductive types who have found a job. In terms of utility, the higher consumption level of these
latter types is balanced by higher work e¤ort and search costs. Since the government is inter-
ested in …ghting poverty (i.e. inequality in consumption levels), it would like to redistribute
resources from the more productive types to the unemployed.
13This is an ex-post utility level. The proportion 1 ¡ ¹ s of these types who do not …nd a
j o be v e nt h o u g ht h e yh a v es e a r c h e d( a n dt h u sh a v ep a i ds e a r c hc o s t s )e n j o yl o w e ru t i l i t yt h a n
the types [nw;n zi who remain unemployed without having searched. The same holds true for
t h em o s tp r o d u c t i v et y p e shnz;n 1] who have the bad luck that they have searched for a job
without …nding one.
14Lemma 20 in the appendix shows that, in the absence of search costs (i.e. ° =0 ), all
agents should search (i.e. nw = n0). Accordingly, the tax system rather than unemployment
bene…ts insure people against the risk of being born with low ability.
15subsidies are required to induce agents to reveal their type. Encouraging more
agents to search thus becomes less attractive. A concave utility function, in
contrast, implies that unequal consumption levels ¹ x and b become relatively
costly. Hence, the government …nds it relatively attractive to …ght poverty by
taking people out of unemployment by paying them a relatively high in-work
tax bene…t ¹ x = ¡T(n) >b :
At the marginal worker nz; the in-work bene…t corresponds to the unemploy-
ment bene…t so that the search subsidy goes to zero (i.e. limn#nz [T (n)+b]=0 ) :
Search thus does not impose any …rst-order welfare e¤ects as the government
pays this worker the same resources in unemployment and work: search is nei-
ther taxed nor subsidized. Accordingly, the search margin is not distorted: the
government can a¤ord to eliminate the search distortion for the lowest type
that provides positive work e¤ort z(n) > 0 through generous in-work bene…ts
because it does not have to worry about such generous in-work bene…ts for less
e¢cient workers distorting the intensive margin of more e¢cient workers.
For the non-marginal workers n>n z; the government extracts positive
rents by fully taxing away the rents on search through a net tax on search
(i.e. T(n)+b>0). The government would like to extract more rents from
these types since the marginal value of production exceeds the direct marginal
resource (i.e. labor) costs for these types, implying a negative distributional
wedge (i.e:¸ E > 1=n = v0(x(n))): The government cannot do this, however,
because the search constraint is binding for these types (i.e. ´(n) > 0): taxing
search more heavily by extracting more rents from high-ability workers would
discourage these high-ability types from looking for a job.
4.1.1 Comparative statics with respect to unemployment bene…ts
This sub-section explores how the optimal tax system responds to an exogenous
change in the unemployment bene…t b: This analysis thus assumes that b is
exogenously given rather than optimally set.
Lemma 7 dnz
db > 0; dnw
db > 0;
dT(n)
db < ¡1 for n>n z;
dT(nz)




db = d¹ x
db > 0 for nw <n<n z.
Higher unemployment compensation reduces the number of agents who work
positive hours (i.e.dnz
db > 0) . Intuitively, a higher unemployment bene…t raises
the productivity requirements for workers who search without a search subsidy:
with a better alternative option (namely not searching and collecting a higher
unemployment bene…t), less workers are inclined to search for a job in the
absence of search subsidies ¡T(n)+b>0: T h el o w e s tt y p et h a ts e a r c h e sf o r
a job without a work subsidy thus becomes more e¢cient. Since the marginal
worker is more productive, marginal resource costs decline (i.e. d¸E
db < 0).T h e s e





The distributional implications of a higher unemployment bene…t are as fol-
lows. Higher unemployment compensation bene…ts all people who do not change
16their employment position. In particular, the consumption levels (and thus wel-
fare) increase not only for the unemployed but also for all types n<n z who keep
collecting in-work bene…ts: not only unemployment compensation but also in-
work bene…ts are increased (i.e. d¹ x
db > 0). Moreover, also the more e¢cient work-
ers who exert positive work e¤ort improve their position, albeit not by increasing
their consumption level but by decreasing their work e¤ort. The reason is that
the government reduces the average tax rate T(n)=n(v(x(n)¡v(b)¡°)¡x(n)
on these types in order to continue to encourage them to search for a job now
that they have a better alternative option of not searching and staying unem-
ployed (i.e. dT(n)=db = ¡nv0(b) < ¡1 as v0(b) > 1=nz > 1=n). The binding
participation constraint thus implies that higher unemployment compensation
is shifted to the high-ability workers. Hence, the government can extract less
rents from the most e¢cient types. Indeed, although the marginal worker be-
comes more productive, the government provides more in-work bene…ts to the
marginal worker (i.e. dT(nz)=db = ¡1). The most e¢cient types respond to
the higher average tax burden by exerting less work e¤ort. Their consumption,
in contrast, remains the same as income e¤ects do not impact consumption.
The cost of higher unemployment bene…ts is a higher unemployment rate.
Accordingly, a larger part of the population has to rely on relatively low un-
employment bene…ts rather than more generous in-work bene…ts. In particular,
the government budget constraint implies that the higher unemployment ben-
e…ts for the unemployed and the higher in-work bene…ts for (and lower tax
revenues from) the employed reduce the budgetary room to pay in-work bene-
…ts ¹ x exceeding the unemployment bene…t b to those who do not search without
a search subsidy. The government thus can a¤ord to pay these generous in-work
bene…ts to less agents, thereby reducing the group of fortunate types who ben-
e…t from search subsidies. At the same time, more people become dependent
on unemployment bene…ts (i.e. dnw=db > 0): Intuitively, higher unemployment
compensation reduces the redistribution that can be carried out through the tax
system by tightening the participation constraint that constrains the taxation
of the more able. Accordingly, social insurance plays a more prominent role in
protecting people against the risk of being born with little skills.
We summarize the distributional implications as follows. Only the types
who no longer obtain the in-work bene…t (and thus stop searching for a job) are
worse o¤. A coalition of the most able and the least able who do not collect
in-work bene…ts thus push for a more important role for unemployment bene…ts.
Those who risk losing their generous in-work bene…ts, in contrast, resist such
a policy by supporting tax bene…ts rather than unemployment bene…ts as an
instrument to alleviate poverty.
4.2 Rich economy
In a rich economy, the government can a¤ord to pay relatively generous search
subsidies to all agents who do not search for a job without such a subsidy.
Rather than unemployment bene…ts, therefore, in-work bene…ts insure agents
17against the risk of being born with low ability.15 Jobs (with in-work bene…ts)
rather than unemployment bene…ts are thus the preferred route out of poverty
due to low productivity. The unemployment system insures people only against
the risk of remaining unemployed after having actively searched for a job. This
risk of involuntary unemployment (i.e. 1 ¡ ¹ s) is the same for all skills. Indeed,
unemployment compensation is paid only to the population share 1 ¡ ¹ s that is
involuntarily unemployed, i.e. those unfortunate agents who looked for a job
(and thus paid search costs) but nevertheless did not …nd one.
In the rich economy, the government budget enjoys a surplus if the govern-
ment extracts the participation rents from all types that search without a net
subsidy n>^ n (z (n)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)))w h i l ea tt h es a m et i m ep r o v i d -
ing not only unemployment bene…ts to the part of the population 1¡¹ s that has
not found work but also tax subsidies that allow all other types who found a job
to enjoy the same consumption level as the marginal worker ^ n without having
to exert any work e¤ort (i.e. ¡T(n)=x(^ n) >bfor n<^ n): What is the optimal
strategy for spending this surplus at a given level of the unemployment compen-
sation b? In view of the concavity of v(:); the marginal utility of consumption
is highest for the marginal worker ^ n (and for all the types n<^ n who bene…t
from net search subsidies ¡(T(n)+b) > 0)). The government thus would like
to employ the surplus to raise the consumption level of this worker. However,
providing the marginal worker ^ n with more consumption reduces the marginal
utility of consumption v0 (x(^ n)) below the marginal utility costs of providing
labor by this type, 1=^ n: Accordingly, the marginal worker ^ n is better o¤ if the
government reduces his work time z(^ n) to zero instead of giving him more con-
sumption. The government therefore utilizes the surplus to increase not only
the consumption level ¹ x for all types that exert no work e¤ort (by raising in-
work bene…ts and thus the search subsidy ¡(T(n)+b)) but also the number
of fortunate types that do not have to exert e¤ort in their jobs. Hence, the
surplus is spent by both raising the level of the search subsidy and the number
of people who are eligible for it. The government thus pays search subsidies also
to people who would search for a job even without search subsidies. As a direct
consequence, the marginal worker is taxed on search (i.e. limn#nz [T (n)+b] > 0
as shown in corollary 6). Intuitively, the government can a¤ord to distort the
search margin for the marginal worker nz because all agents search (i.e. nw has
a corner solution).
The government continues to spend its surplus in this way until the gov-
ernment budget constraint holds with equality. When spending the surplus,
the government ensures that the marginal utility of consumption equals the
marginal labor costs for the lowest type that exerts e¤ort (i.e, v0 (¹ x)= 1
nz where
nz is the marginal worker). How much of the surplus goes to additional con-
sumption and how much goes to less work e¤ort depends on the concavity of
15In a rich economy, those born with low ability are better o¤ (in terms of utility) than the
most e¢cient types but enjoy lower consumption levels. In a normal economy, in contrast,
insurance against low ability is less good since some agents with low ability do not bene…t from
generous in-work bene…ts and have to rely on relatively low unemployment bene…ts. This still
makes them as well o¤ (in terms of utility), however, as the most e¢cient types.
18v(:) and the density function f(:): The faster marginal utility of consumption
declines with consumption (as re‡ected in the concavity of v(:)) and the thicker
is the density f(:) just above the marginal worker ^ n; the larger is the share of
the surplus that is spent on reducing work e¤ort by marginal workers rather
than on raising search subsidies for those who exert no work e¤ort.16
4.2.1 Comparative statics with respect to unemployment bene…ts
An exogenous increase in unemployment compensation yields di¤erent employ-




db < ¡1 for n>n z; d¸E
db > 0 and ¡
dT(n)
db = d¹ x
db < 0 for
n 2 [n0;n zi.
Whereas in a normal economy a higher unemployment bene…t decreases the
number of workers who exert work e¤ort (i.e. dnz
db > 0); in a rich economy
such a higher bene…t increases this number (dnz
db < 0). The reason for this is
as follows. Higher unemployment bene…ts impose two additional burdens on
the government budget. First, they raise the expenditures on unemployment
compensation for the share of the population (1 ¡ ¹ s) that is involuntarily un-
employed. Second, they reduce the tax revenues that can be extracted from
the most e¢cient types as these types now …nd it more attractive to rely on
the higher unemployment bene…ts rather than searching for a job. These two
additional budgetary burdens reduce the resources that can be spend on search
subsidies. Hence, higher unemployment compensation reduces both the level of
these search subsidies (thereby reducing the consumption of the least e¢cient
agents) and the number of people who are eligible for these search subsidies
(thereby increasing work e¤ort for marginal workers). At the same time, in
response to their lower average tax burden, the more e¢cient types who already
exerted work e¤ort reduce that work e¤ort. Work e¤ort is thus spread out more
equally over various workers as the more generous unemployment bene…ts, by
tightening the participation constraint of the most e¢cient workers, allows for
less redistribution through the tax system. Indeed, a higher unemployment ben-
e…t pushes the rich economy away from the economy without a search margin
(discussed in sub-section 3.1) in which only the most e¢cient worker provides
positive work e¤ort.
The distributional e¤ects of higher unemployment compensation are now as
follows. Higher unemployment compensation bene…ts not only the unemployed
(a proportion 1¡¹ s of the population) by raising their bene…t level and thus their
consumption but also the e¢cient types by reducing their tax burden and thus
16Lemma 14 shows formally that v0 (¹ x)= 1
nz is optimal. In particular, if too much of the
surplus is spend on consumption (i.e. v0 (¹ x) < 1
nz ); marginal labor costs exceed marginal
bene…ts from consumption for type nz. Hence, the government can raise social welfare by
reducing both ¹ x and z (nz): If too much of the surplus is spend on leisure (i.e. v0 (¹ x) > 1
nz ),
in contrast, some types n<n z could raise their utility by working more z (n) > 0 to raise their
own consumption because the own labor costs are lower than the bene…ts from consumption.
19their work e¤ort. All other types (who all have searched for a job and found
one) lose as the marginal worker becomes less productive so that the opportunity
costs of consumption increases. Also in the rich economy, therefore, a higher
unemployment bene…t makes the tax system a less e¤ective redistributional
device as the inequality of consumption increases between the most e¢cient
types who exert positive work e¤ort (and whose consumption is not a¤ected by
the higher unemployment compensation) and the types who work zero hours and
rely on in-work bene…ts to …nance their consumption. A coalition of the most
able and the unemployed therefore pushes for higher unemployment bene…ts
while people who risk losing generous in-work bene…ts resist such a policy. In
a normal economy, these latter agents are hurt by becoming unemployed while
in a rich economy they are harmed by receiving less generous in-work bene…ts.
Combining the comparative static results on higher unemployment compen-
sation for the rich and the normal economies, we …nd that the population that
exerts work e¤ort is largest at the point where a rich economy turns into a
normal economy. Starting from a rich economy, a higher unemployment bene-
…t …rst reduces the population that can be allowed to enjoy leisure (by paying
them generous in-work bene…ts). Eventually, a higher unemployment bene…t
exhausts the surplus that can be spend on providing search subsidies to agents
who would search without being paid such a search subsidy. At that point, the
rich economy turns into a normal economy. An even higher unemployment ben-
e…t raises the productivity requirements for the worker that is indi¤erent about
searching for a job in the absence of search subsidy. This causes the number of
workers who exert positive work e¤ort to decline. Accordingly, the relationship
between the unemployment bene…t and the number of people who do exert work
e¤ort is U shaped.
Also the relationship between the in-work bene…ts and unemployment ben-
e…ts is U shaped. At low unemployment compensation, unemployment bene…ts
and in-work bene…ts are substitutes in …ghting poverty because higher unem-
ployment bene…ts absorb the budgetary room for generous in-work bene…ts as
an instrument to …ght poverty. At high unemployment bene…ts, however, the
participation constraint for marginal workers is binding and higher unemploy-
ment bene…ts induce government to raise in-work bene…ts on marginal workers
and reduce taxes on more e¢cient workers in order to induce these agents to
continue to look for work. In-work bene…ts thus help to o¤set the impact of
higher unemployment bene…ts on the participation constraint so that in-work
bene…ts and unemployment compensation are complements. The relationship
between in-work bene…ts and unemployment compensation explains why gener-
ous in-work bene…ts are called for in countries that grant both low and high un-
employment bene…ts. In countries with low unemployment compensation (such
as the United States), in-work bene…ts are used to alleviate poverty. In coun-
tries with high unemployment compensation (such as most Western European
countries), in contrast, in-work bene…ts protect the incentives to participate in
the labor market.
205 Optimal unemployment bene…ts17
This section establishes that, even if unemployment bene…ts are optimally set18,
a search subsidy (T (n)+b<0) can be optimal if the participation constraints
for high types are binding. These participation constraints are binding because
the government can observe the ability of working agents. Relaxing this latter
assumption implies that high-ability types enjoy a positive surplus so that their
participation constraints are no longer binding. In these circumstances, the
incentive compatibility constraint binds for higher types and a search subsidy
(T (n)+b<0) cannot be optimal.
We determine the optimal level of unemployment compensation by taking
the …rst order condition of (4) with respect to b: This yields (using (5) to elim-
inate ´(n))











Employing the results from proposition 4 (i.e. v0 (x(n)) = 1=n for n>n z and










[F (nw)+( 1¡ ¹ s)(1¡ F (nw))]
(11)
The left-hand side of this expression stands for the direct marginal bene…ts of
more generous unemployment compensation in terms of a higher utility level
for the unemployed. The right-hand side represents the marginal social costs,
consisting of the direct marginal resource (i.e. labor) costs ¸E and the indirect
adverse impact on the participation margin (and therefore the search incentives)
of the more e¢cient types who exert positive work e¤ort. These latter distor-
tionary e¤ects of higher unemployment compensation on search incentives give
rise to a positive distributional wedge for the unemployed (i.e. v0(b)¡ ¸E > 0):
In this way, the participation margin produces a trade o¤ between equity (in-
creasing the consumption level of the unemployed) and e¢ciency (stimulating















we observe that positive distributional wedges for the unemployed (i.e. the left-
hand side of (12)) contrast with negative19 distributional wedges for the workers
17This section assumes g<g ¤ (°) so that government spending can be …nanced with b =0 :
18If unemployment bene…ts are not optimally set, it is obvious that T (n)+b<0 can
be optimal also if workers’ types cannot be observed. To see this, consider the case where
b =0 . Then we are left with a standard Mirrlees (1971) problem in which the government
redistributes from high ability types to low ability types. Thus T (n) < 0 for low ability types
and hence T (n)+b = T (n)+0< 0 for low ability types.
19This follows from ¸E=v0(x(n)) = n=nz > 1 for n>n z (see proposition 4).
21who work positive hours. The government thus wants to redistribute resources
from the latter to the former group but cannot do so because of the binding
participation constraint of the latter group.
The major distributional problem di¤ers between the case in which the
worker’s type is veri…able and the case in which search is veri…able (see Boone
and Bovenberg (2001)). If search rather than the worker’s type is veri…able, the
intensive rather than the extensive margin is relevant. In that case, the distri-
butional wedge is positive (i.e. v0(x(n)) >¸ E) for the least e¢cient workers as
the government would like to redistribute resources to the less e¢cient work-
ers but cannot do so because doing so would induce the more e¢cient workers
to mimic the less e¢cient workers by reducing their work e¤ort. Indeed, in
the presence of the intensive margin, the redistribution between high skill and
low skill workers who have found a job and exert positive e¤ort is problematic.
Without the extensive margin, the government can redistribute from workers
towards the unemployed without harming search incentives. In the presence of
the extensive margin, in contrast, the distribution between those who supply
positive work e¤ort and the unemployed is problematic.
Whereas unemployment bene…ts are a relatively e¢cient redistributive in-
strument in the absence of the extensive margin, in-work tax bene…ts are rel-
atively e¢cient in the absence of the intensive margin. Indeed, in the absence
of the extensive margin, the marginal utility of consumption of the unemployed
equals the direct resource costs so that distributional wedge for the unemployed
is zero (i.e. v0(b)=¸E; see Boone and Bovenberg (2001)). In the absence of
the intensive margin, in contrast, the distributional wedge for the least e¢cient
workers who rely on in-work bene…ts is zero (i.e. v0(¡T(n)) = v0(¹ x)=¸E
for nw <n<n z): The reason is that the more e¢cient types cannot mimic
(by providing less work e¤ort) the less e¢cient working types who bene…t from
generous in-work bene…ts (i.e. ¡T(n)=¹ x): These in-work bene…ts therefore
do not directly distort the incentives of the more e¢cient workers who supply
positive work e¤ort. Whereas the more e¢cient workers cannot mimic the less
e¢cient workers, they can still mimic the unemployed by not searching for a job.
In contrast to in-work bene…ts, unemployment compensation therefore distorts
the decisions of the most e¢cient workers. This gives rise to a trade o¤ between
equity and e¢ciency in that the unemployed feature a positive distributional
wedge.
The relative e¢ciency of in-work bene…ts compared to unemployment bene-
…ts explains why a search subsidy (i.e. T(n)+b<0) is optimal for some types
even though the unemployment bene…ts are optimally set. The general insight
is that a search subsidy is optimal only if the tax system is a more e¤ective
distributional instrument than the social insurance system. This can be the
case because the participation constraint is binding for high types. The follow-
ing simple example shows that under these conditions the government may not
want to use unemployment compensation at all if search is e¤ective (i.e. if ¹ s
large enough).
Example 9 Consider an economy with only two types of agents: n0 =0and
22n1 > 0 with proportions f0 and f1 (f0 +f1 =1 ). Assume that the search cost °





where x is determined by v0 (x)= 1
n1. In this economy it is clear that z0 = y0 =0
because production by type n0 does not yield any output. Clearly, the government
would like to redistribute from the n1 type to the n0 type. The question is:
does this take the form of unemployment bene…ts b or in work bene…ts x0.T o


















+¸E f¡f0s0x0 + f1s1 (z1 ¡ x1) ¡ [f0 (1 ¡ s0)+f1 (1 ¡ s1)]bg






¡ ° ¡ v(b)
¾
We derive conditions here under which the optimal unemployment bene…t b
equals zero, while the in work bene…t x0 is positive. For this we only need
the …rst order conditions for x1 and z1:


















Since we want to redistribute as much consumption from type n1 to type n0 as
possible, type n1 has to work as much hours as possible.20 The maximal amount
is determined by the search constraint v(x1) ¡ z1
n1 ¸ v(b)+°.H e n c ew e… n d
z1 = n1 (v(x1) ¡ v(b) ¡ °)
Now if b is raised, the social gains equal
[f0 (1 ¡ s0)+f1 (1¡ s1)]v0 (b)
20The planner, however, should not redistribute so much that x0 >x 1. To avoid this,




f0 <x 1: T h el a s ti n e q u a l i t yi sm e td u et ot h ea s s u m p t i o n sm a d eo n°.
23while the social costs equal the cost of additional expenses on b plus the loss
in tax revenue (which equals f1s1n1v0 (b) because the expression for z1 above
implies thatdz1
db = ¡n1v0(b))
¸E ff0 (1 ¡ s0)+f1 (1 ¡ s1)+f1s1n1v0 (b)g
If at b =0the costs exceed the gains, the optimal unemployment bene…t level
equals 0:
¸Ef1s1n1v0 (0) + [f0 (1 ¡ s0)+f1 (1 ¡ s1)](¸E ¡ v0 (0)) > 0
or equivalently (using v0 (0) = +1 and ¸E ¸ 1




The interpretation of this condition is that search should be relatively e¤ective.
We can approximate the magnitude of the optimal search subsidy ¡T(n) ¡
b =¹ x¡b by using v0(¹ x)¡v0(b)=v00(»)(¹ x¡b) (with b<»<¹ x) and substituting
v0(¹ x)=¸E into (11) to arrive at













[F (nw)+( 1¡ ¹ s)(1¡ F (nw))]
: (13)
The inequality in consumption levels between the fortunate types who bene-
…t from in-work bene…ts and the unfortunate ones who have to rely on lower
unemployment compensation increases in the distortionary costs of unemploy-
ment bene…ts on the search margin of the more e¢cient types (as re‡ected in







dn): The inequality in consumption levels declines,
however, in the aversion against inequality in consumption (as re‡ected in the
inverse of the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion
¡v0(b)
»v00(»)) and in the number of
people who rely on unemployment bene…ts for their consumption (as re‡ected
in the unemployment rate F (nw)+( 1¡ ¹ s)(1¡ F (nw))):
The following proposition shows that the result above that in-work bene…ts
can exceed b crucially depends on the assumption that the government can
observe workers’ ability.
Proposition 10 If the government cannot observe workers’ ability and b is
optimally set, then nw >n 0 implies that
T (n)+b ¸ 0
for each n ¸ nw.
If the government cannot observe workers’ ability, any feasible tax system
has the property that in-work utility rises with ability (i.e. u0 (n) > 0).F o r
24all non-marginal workers n>n w;u (nw) ¸ ° + v(b) together with u0 (n) > 0
implies that u(n) >°+ v(b) for n>n w so that the participation constraint
is binding only for the marginal worker nw. For the non-marginal workers,
the incentive compatibility constraint rather than the participation constraint
is binding. Higher unemployment compensation therefore damages the search
incentives of only the marginal worker nw and do not directly harm the tax
revenues that can be extracted from more e¢cient types. In-work bene…ts for
poor workers (which raise u(n) for low types), in contrast, harm the incentives
facing more e¢cient types, thereby forcing the government to reduce the tax
level on more e¢cient types so as to prevent high-ability workers from mimicing
low-ability types. Indeed, compared to the case with observable abilities consid-
ered in the rest of this paper, in-work bene…ts become a less e¢cient instrument
to …ght poverty while unemployment bene…ts become more e¢cient. This pro-
vides some intuition for why in-work bene…ts ¡T(n) can exceed unemployment
bene…ts only if ability is veri…able.
The reason for why work should be taxed (i.e. T(n)+b ¸ 0) can alternatively
be stated as follows. The participation constraint u(n) ¸ ° +v(b) implies that
consumption of workers exceed the consumption of the unemployed. Hence, un-
employment compensation is more e¤ective way to …ght poverty than in-work
bene…ts are because unemployment bene…ts accrue to the poorest agents. Since
the participation constraint is binding only for the marginal worker nw; the
only e¢ciency cost of higher unemployment compensation is that it harms the
incentives of marginal workers to search for a job. In the optimum, therefore,
the government balances the marginal distributional bene…ts of unemployment
compensation with its marginal e¢ciency costs. Accordingly, the marginal ex-
ternal e¤ect on the government budget constraint of the marginal worker nw
looking for a job should be positive, i.e. T (nw)+b ¸ 0: Non-marginal workers
are taxed even heavier (i.e. T(n) >T (nw) for n>n w) in view of the redis-
tributive preferences of the government so that the tax on search, T (n)+b; is
positive for all workers.
5.1 Rich versus normal economies
This subsection explores the conditions for the optimal allocation being either
a rich or a normal economy. Lemma 21 in the Appendix shows that with zero
search costs (° =0 ) the optimal tax system implies a rich economy in which the
unemployed (a proportion 1¡¹ s of the population) are involuntarily unemployed
in the sense that they searched to full capacity for a job but could not …nd
one. By having all types search for a job, the government relies maximally
on in-work bene…ts to relieve poverty. Intuitively, the advantage of in-work
bene…ts over unemployment compensation as a redistributive device is that these
bene…ts can better target the less e¢cient types by using more information. This
information, however, is not costless: agents can reveal this information only
after having searched for jobs, thereby paying search costs °>0: Without
these search costs, however, in-work bene…ts only have advantages so that the
government maximally relies on in-work bene…ts. By searching and …nding a
25job, people costlessly reveal their ability.
The comparative static results on raising unemployment compensation in
a rich economy showed that raising unemployment bene…t eventually turns a
rich economy into a normal economy as the government no longer has enough
funds to pay generous search subsidies to all types that would not search with-
out a subsidy. Hence, at given positive search costs °>0; a rich economy is
more likely to be optimal if the optimal unemployment bene…t b is relatively
low. In that case, the government can extract substantial rents from the most
e¢cient types because these types …nd it relatively unattractive to mimic the
unemployed. Expression (13) indicates that the optimal unemployment bene-
…ts are not generous if search is e¤ective (as indicated by a high level of ¹ s) and
the agents are not particularly risk averse (as indicated by a low coe¢cient of
relative risk aversion
¡v0(b)
»v00(»)). Intuitively, if not many people are involuntarily
unemployed and the government does not care much about inequality in con-
sumption, the government sets unemployment compensation b at a relatively
low level.21
We thus conclude that a rich economy, which minimizes the dependency
on the social insurance system and employs jobs (and in-work bene…ts) rather
than bene…t dependence as a anti-poverty device, is more likely to be observed if
search is cheap (i.e. ° is low) and e¤ective (i.e. ¹ s is large), agents are productive
(so that ^ n is close to n0 and the government does not need to pay many agents a
search subsidy to induce them to search for a job) and agents are not particularly
risk averse so that they do not mind poor insurance against unemployment risk.
In these circumstances, unemployment risk is low and people do not mind this
risk.
The unemployment system continues to play an important role in protecting
agents against lack of skills if search is expensive and ine¤ective and agents
are not productive (so that using the tax system is expensive), especially if
agents are risk averse. In that case, high unemployment bene…ts reduce the
budgetary room for paying in-work bene…ts to a large population that is not
productive enough to search for a job without these generous in-work bene…ts.
In particular, people must be paid high in-work bene…ts in order to overcome the
search costs for revealing their type. Moreover, in-work bene…ts cannot reach
the involuntary unemployed (i.e. those who search but still remain unemployed).
Intuitively, jobs (and the associated in-work bene…ts) are expensive and di¢cult
to get. Work is an expensive and ine¤ective way out of poverty because in-work
bene…ts are expensive (as search costs are high) and fail to reach the involuntary
unemployed.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper has explored the interaction between the tax system and unemploy-
ment insurance in insuring people against the risks of involuntary unemployment
21In the limit with ¹ s =1and ° =0 , we are back in the model without a search margin. In
that case b = ¡1 and only type n1 works.
26and low ability. Our results suggest that the optimal search subsidy (i.e. the
di¤erence between the in-work bene…t and the unemployment bene…t) falls with
the importance of the incentive compatibility constraint (work e¤ort) relative
to that of the individual rationality constraint (search e¤ort). The more elas-
tic search e¤ort and the less well the government can enforce the work test by
observing search e¤ort, the more in-work bene…ts should be employed to …ght
poverty of low-ability agents and protect the search incentives of workers. This
holds true especially if ability can be observed or work e¤ort is relatively inelas-
tic so that the incentive compatibility constraint plays no or only a minor role
in constraining redistribution within the group of workers.
By assuming that the government can observe a worker’s type, we have
stacked the cards in favor of in-work tax bene…ts as an instrument to …ght
poverty. We showed, however, that even with this strong informational assump-
tion, the redistributive power of the tax system is constrained if the government
cannot verify job search. In particular, the …nancing of in-work bene…ts can be
problematic if search costs are high and agents are not productive. This is espe-
cially so if high unemployment bene…ts constrain the ability of the government
to extract taxes from the more e¢cient workers. In this way, unemployment
compensation limits the ability of the tax system to …nance in-work bene…ts.
If the government can optimally set both the tax system and unemploy-
ment compensation, the government faces a trade o¤ in deciding on the relative
importance of in-work bene…ts and unemployment compensation. Relying on
in-work bene…ts allows e¤ective targeting of bene…ts at workers with low ability
without directly distorting the search incentives of more able workers. How-
ever, in-work bene…ts are expensive if search costs are high. Moreover, they
do not reach individuals who are su¤er from involuntary search unemployment.
Clearly, unemployment insurance remains important in insuring agents against
unemployment risk. The unemployment system continues to play an important
role also in protecting agents against lack of skills if search is expensive and in-
e¤ective and agents are not productive. In that case, work is an expensive and
ine¤ective way out of poverty. Interpreting the in-work bene…ts to agents who
do not exert any work e¤ort as disability bene…ts, the government trades o¤ the
bene…ts of better targeting of disability bene…ts against the costs of tagging. In
particular, the government relies on disability rather than unemployment ben-
e…ts to protect agents against the risk being born with low ability if tagging is
cheap and e¤ective (i.e. ° is low and ¹ s is high) and agents are productive so
that only a few agents must be granted disability bene…ts.
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Appendix: Proofs of results
P r o o fo fl e m m a3
De…ne b as the solution in b of the following equation
Z n1
^ n(b)
f (n)¹ s(n[v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)] ¡ x(n))dn + F (^ n(b)) ¹ s(¡x(^ n(b))) = b(1¡ ¹ s)+g
and if there is no solution b ¸ 0 to this equation, de…ne b =0 . The left-hand
side of this equation is decreasing in b (where ^ n is de…ned in equation (8) and
we use
d^ n(b)
db > 0 as derived in the proof of lemma 7 below) while the right-hand
side is increasing in b. Hence, if there is a solution to the equation, it is unique.
Note that if b > 0;then a value b<bimplies that the economy is rich.
De…ne ¹ b as the solution in b of the following equation
Z n1
^ n(b)
f (n)¹ s(n[v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)] ¡ x(n))dn = b(1 ¡ ¹ s[1 ¡ F (^ n(b))]) + g
This value of ¹ b is always well de…ned because (i) the left-hand side of this equa-
tion is decreasing in b (use
d^ n(b)
db > 0 a sd e r i v e di nt h ep r o o fo fl e m m a7b e l o w ) ,
(ii) the right-hand side is increasing in b, (iii) at b =0the left-hand side exceeds
the right-hand side by the assumption that g<g ¤ (°) and (iv) the right-hand
side exceeds the left hand side at a value of b satisfying ^ n(b)=n1. Finally, note
that for b 2 [b;¹ b] we have the normal economy and for b>¹ b we have a poor
economy. QED
P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n4
The proposition is proved for the normal economy, using a number of lem-
mas derived below. Once the solution for the normal economy is proved, the
extension to the rich economy is straightforward.
Lemma 11 If z (n) > 0 for some n 2 [n0;n 1] then z (n0) > 0 for each n0 >n .


































and thus ´(n0)=0 ,w h i l e´(n) ¸ 0. However, this implies
¡
1
n0 + ¸E ¡ ´(n0)
1
¹ sf (n0)n0 = ¡
1
n0 + ¸E > ¡
1
n




which contradicts inequality (14).
Lemma 12 If z (n) > 0 for some n then it is the case that
z (n0)=n0 (v (x(n0)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b))
for each n0 >n .
Proof. Suppose not, that is assume that for some n0 >nwe have
z (n0) <n 0 (v (x(n0)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b))
Then there exists ">0 such that the alternative function ~ z(n) which equals
z (n) everywhere except for the points n and n0 where ~ z is determined by
~ z (n0)=z (n0)+"




For " small enough this function ~ z satis…es all the constraints and ~ z is budget
neutral by construction. It is routine to verify that ~ z yields higher welfare than
z.
Now de…ne ~ nz as follows
~ nz ´ inf fn ¸ n0jz (n) > 0g
29Then we …nd from the results above, (5), and (6) that for each n>~ nz; it is the
case that
´(n) > 0




Now turn to the types below ~ nz. Note that the following result does not assume
that the set [nw; ~ nzi is non-empty. We will prove below that the set is in fact
non-empty.
Lemma 13 For each n 2 [nw; ~ nzi we have that z (n)=0and x(n)=~ x for
some ~ x>0.
Proof. z (n)=0follows from the de…nition of ~ nz. The result that all these
agents get the same consumption level follows from the concavity of v(:).
Lemma 14 v0 (~ x)= 1
~ nz.
Proof. Suppose not (in two parts):
(i) suppose (by contradiction) that v0 (~ x) < 1
~ nz.T h i si m p l i e st h a t~ x>x(~ nz)
and hence
v(~ x) >v(x(~ nz)) ¡
z (~ nz)
~ nz
¸ ° + v(b)
Then we can construct new functions ~ x(:) and ~ z (:) which are identical to x(:)
and z (:) with the following exceptions
~ x(n)=~ x ¡ "
~ z (~ nz)=z (~ nz) ¡ "
f (n)
f (~ nz)
for some type n 2 [nw; ~ nzi and ">0 small enough. These functions ~ z and ~ x are
budget neutral and do not violate any constraint (as long as " small enough)
and raise aggregate welfare.
(ii) suppose (by contradiction) that v0 (~ x) > 1
~ nz. Then there exists a type
n<~ nz such that for some ">0 we have




That is the government can raise the utility of this type n without making
anyone worse o¤.
Lemma 15 Assume that nw < ~ nz then v0 (~ x)=¸E.
30Proof. ´(n) ¸ 0 implies (from (5)) that v0 (~ x) · ¸E: So the question is
whether v0 (~ x) <¸ E is possible. Assume (by contradiction) that v0 (~ x) <¸ E is
indeed possible. Then we have ´(n) > 0 and thus (by complementary slackness
and z(n)=0 ) v(~ x)=° + v(b) so that ~ x>b . Now consider equation (7) using
v(~ x)=° + v(b):
0 ¡ ¸E (z (~ nw) ¡ ~ x + b)=0
However, this implies that z (~ nw)=~ x ¡ b>0 which contradicts nw < ~ nz.
Corollary 16 ´(n)=0for all n 2 [nw; ~ nzi.
Lemma 17 ¸E = 1
~ nz.
Proof. Suppose not (in two parts)
(i) suppose (by contradiction) that ¸E > 1
~ nz. The equation for z (~ nz) > 0




+ ¸E ¡ ´(~ nz)
1
¹ sf (~ nz)~ nz
=0
But then there exists n<~ nz such that ¡ 1
n + ¸E ¡ 0 > 0 which contradicts
z (n)=0 .
(ii) suppose (by contradiction) that ¸E < 1
~ nz. Then there exists n0 > ~ nz
such that ¸En0 < 1 which contradicts ´(n0)=f (n0)¹ s(¸En0 ¡ 1) ¸ 0 for this
type n0 > ~ nz.
Lemma 18 ~ nz =^ n where ^ n is de…ned in equation (8).
Proof. Substituting z (nw)=0 ;x(nw)=~ x (with v0 (~ x)= 1
~ nz), and ¸E =
1
~ nzinto equation (7), we arrive at
v(b)+° ¡ v(~ x) ¡
1
~ nz
(¡~ x + b)=0 : (15)
To analyze the solution to this equation, we write the function ³° : <+£<+ ¡!
< a sd e … n e di ne q u a t i o n( 9 )a s
³° (n;b)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ v(b) ¡ °) ¡ x(n)+b
where x(n) is de…ned by v0 (x(n)) =
1
n
Thus equation (15) boils down to
³° (n;b)=0
for exogenously given b.
As the next lemma shows this equation has at most two solutions.
31Lemma 19 For each b ¸ 0,i ti st h ec a s et h a t
(i) the equation ³0 (n;b)=0has a unique solution ^ n ¸ 0 with x(^ n)=b;
(ii) the equation ³° (n;b)=0with °>0 has exactly two solutions 0 < ^ n1 < ^ n2
with
v(x(^ n1)) <v (b)+°
v(x(^ n2)) >v (b)+°
Proof. First, note that ³° is strictly convex in n. This follows from
@³° (n;b)
@n
= v(x(n)) ¡ v(b) ¡ °
@2³° (n;b)










Second, note that ³° (0;b)=b>0 (here we use the assumption that
limx#0 v0 (x)=+ 1), limn!+1 ³° (n;b)=+ 1 and that
min
n¸0
³° (n;b)=b ¡ v¡1 (v(b)+°)
Now consider the cases ° =0and °>0 in turn. If ° =0 ,w es e et h a t
minn¸0 ³0 (n;b)=0 . So by the strict convexity of ³0,t h ev a l u e^ n for which
this minimum is reached is the unique solution to ³0 (n;b)=0 . Further, using
the …rst order condition
@³0(n;b)
@n =0for this minimum yields immediately that
v(x(^ n)) ¡ v(b)=0or equivalently x(^ n)=b.
Next, consider the case where °>0.T h e nc l e a r l yminn¸0 ³° (n;b) < 0,s o
(using ³° (0;b)=b>0 and limn!+1 ³° (n;b)=+ 1)w eh a v et w os o l u t i o n st o
the equation ³° (n;b)=0 . At the smallest (^ n1) of these solutions, we have that
³° is downward sloping (see …gure 1):
@³° (n;b)
@n
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
n=^ n1
= v(x(^ n1)) ¡ v(b) ¡ °<0
and thus v(x(^ n1)) <v(b)+°. Similarly, at ^ n2 the function ³° is upward sloping
(again see …gure 1) and we have v(x(^ n2)) >v(b)+°.
Using this result, we continue the proof that ~ nz = nz =^ n.I f ° =0 ,
equation (15) has only one solution and hence it is indeed the case that ~ nz =
maxfn ¸ 0j³0 (n;b)=0 g.I f°>0, we need the solution to equation (15) which
features v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¸ v(b). That is, we need the solution ^ n2 in the lemma
above. So again we have ~ nz =m a x
©
n ¸ 0j³° (n;b)=0
ª
. ¥
This …nishes the proof of the proposition for the normal economy case.
Section 4.2 discusses how the solution for the normal economy is adapted
for the rich economy case. QED.
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y6
32Because nz =^ n i nan o r m a le c o n o m y ,w ek n o wf o rn>n z that
v(x(n)) ¡ v (b) ¡ ° +
1
n
(¡x(n)+b) > 0 (16)
where v0 (x(n)) = 1
n. Combining this with z (n)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ ° ¡ v (b)) for
n>n z we …nd
T (n)+b = z (n) ¡ x(n)+b
= n
½






because of equation (16). Similarly, because by de…nition of ^ n we have




and nz =^ n,w eh a v et h a tlimn#nz [T (n)+b]=0 . Finally, for types n 2 [nw;n zi
we have x(n)=¹ x = x(nz) > 0 and z (n)=0 .T h u sv(¹ x) ¸ v(x(nz))¡
z(nz)
nz ¸
v(b)+°.T h u s°>0 implies ¹ x>bor equivalently ¡¹ x + b<0.
In the rich economy, nz > ^ n and z (n)=n(v(x(n)) ¡ v(b) ¡ °) imply
T (n)+b>0 for all n ¸ nz. The argument that T (n)+b = ¡¹ x + b<0 is the
same as in the normal economy.¥
P r o o fo fL e m m a7
In normal economy nz =^ n and nw is determined by government budget
constraint. Hence dnz
db = d^ n
db where ^ n is de…ned in equation (8). To …nd the
e¤ect of b on ^ n we di¤erentiate the equation ³° (n;b) with respect to n and b.
This yields
(v(x(^ n)) ¡ v(b) ¡ °)
d^ n
db
¡ (^ nv0 (b) ¡ 1) = 0
Therefore d^ n
db > 0 because v(x(^ n)) ¡ v(b) ¡ °>0 and v0 (b) > 1
^ n (the last
inequality follows from b<x (^ n)). This is illustrated in …gure 1 where b is
raised from b to b0 >b .
The e¤ect that dnw




4¡f (^ n)¹ s(^ n(v(x(^ n)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)))
| {z }
>0
¡ ¹ s(F (^ n) ¡ F (nw))
dx(^ n)




















33Hence we …nd that dnw
db > 0.
Using the fact that b<x(^ n) and thus that v0 (b) >v 0 (x(^ n)) = 1





d(z (n) ¡ x(n))
db




for all n>^ n.
By de…nition T (nz)+b =0(because nz =^ n is the least e¢cient type that





db , recall that ¸E = 1
nz and that dnz































dnz > 0 (from v’(x(nz)) = 1=nz):
P r o o fo fL e m m a8
To …nd dnz
db di¤erentiate the government budget constraint in the rich econ-
omy with respect to b and nz. This can be written as





1 ¡ ¹ sF (nz) ¡
Z n1
nz
f (n)¹ s(¡nv0 (b)+1 )
¸
Using the results that [v(x(nz)) ¡ ° ¡ v(b)] > 0 and ¡nv0 (b)+1< 0 (because
b<x(n) implies v0 (b) >v 0 (x(n)) = 1




db < ¡1 for n>n z is the same as the analogous proof
for the normal economy in lemma 7 above.
Using the results that d¸E
dnz = ¡ 1
n2
z < 0 and dnz






















34for n 2 [n0;n zi.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 0
Here we no longer assume that the government can observe workers’ ability.
Hence in our optimization problem we need to take into account that the pro-
posed tax schedule is incentive compatible. In other words, given a certain tax
schedule ~ T (z) as a function of gross income, workers choose their production to
maximize in-work utility u(x;z)=v
³
z ¡ ~ T (z)
´
¡ z
n.U s i n g ,a sa b o v e ,u(n) to
















To derive this we have used the …rst order condition for z.22 To facilitate the
inclusion of equation (17) into our optimization problem, we use u(n) as variable
instead of x(n) as we did in (4). Thus the optimization problem now becomes
max
nw;u(:);z(:)











+ ¸E [f(n)¹ sT(n)]
¾
dn
¡¸E fb[F (nw)+( 1¡ F (nw))(1 ¡ ¹ s)] + gg
¡´w (° ¡ u(nw)+v(b))







z (n) ¸ 0 for each type, equation (17) implies that u0 (n) ¸ 0 so that there is
only one type nw for which the restriction ° ¡ u(nw)+v(b) · 0 is binding. In
fact, if nw >n 0 then it is the case that
u(nw)=° + v(b)
To see this, note …rst that u(nw) <°+v(b) is not possible as type nw will not
exert e¤ort s to …nd a job. Also u(nw) >°+v(b) is not possible because that
gives an incentive to a type n<n w (but close to nw) to mimic type nw and …nd
a job. This violates incentive compatibility in terms of search. The …rst-order
22Ebert (1992) shows that one can derive an optimal tax system which is in fact not incentive
compatible if one ignores the second order condition for z (:).T oa v o i dt h i s ,o n es h o u l da d d
the restriction that z0 (n) ¸ 0 but this is beyond the scope of this paper. The interested reader
is referred to Boone and Bovenberg (2001).







4¡° ¡ v (b)+u(nw)
| {z }
=0

























The transversality conditions are23
¸u (nw)+´w =0 (21)
¸u (n1)=0 ; (22)











dn =[ F (nw)+( 1¡ F (nw))(1 ¡ ¹ s)]b + g
(23)















+¹ sf (n)(¸En ¡ 1): (25)
We are now set to prove that b + T (nw) ¸ 0. Suppose not. That is, assume
(by contradiction) that b+T (nw) < 0. Then equation (18) implies that ´w < 0
and thus we …nd from (21) that
¸u (nw) > 0
We now consider two subcases: (i) ¸Enw ¡ 1 ¸ 0 and (ii) ¸Enw ¡ 1 < 0 and
show that the result ¸u(nw) > 0 leads to a contradiction in each case.
(i) If ¸Enw¡1 ¸ 0; then ¸u (nw) > 0 together with equation (25) implies that
¸u(n) > 0 for each n>n w. However, this contradicts the second transversality
condition (22) that ¸u (n1)=0 .
23Kamien and Schwartz (1981: 208, 209) derive the transversality condition for the case
where the end value of a state variable can be freely chosen but has to satisfy an inequality
constraint. Our condition above is the equivalent of that condition for a free starting point
under an inequality constraint. The intuition is the following. If the constraint is binding,
the Lagrange multiplier is strictly positive ´w > 0 and hence the shadow value ¸u (nw) is
negative. In other words, one would like to reduce u(nw) (as ¸u (nw) < 0) but cannot do so
because of the constraint u(nw) ¸ ° + v (b).
36(ii) If ¸Enw ¡ 1 < 0,t h e nu s i n g¸u (nw) > 0 together with (22) it must be
t h ec a s et h a tt h e r ee x i s t s~ n · n1 such that ¸u (~ n)=0and ¸
0
u (~ n) · 0.T h e
combination of ¸u (~ n)=0with ¸
0
u (~ n) · 0 implies that
¸E~ n ¡ 1 · 0 (26)
Now we write the …rst-order condition for b as
[F (nw)+( 1¡ F (nw))(1 ¡ ¹ s)]v0 (b) ¡ ¸E [F (nw)+( 1¡ F (nw))(1 ¡ ¹ s)] = ´wv0 (b)
Since our assumption (to be contradicted) that T (nw)+b<0 implies that
´w < 0, this equation implies ¸E >v 0 (b). Furthermore, the participation
constraint (with °>0) implies that x(n) >bfor n ¸ nw and thus we must
have v0 (b) >v 0 (x(n)) for all n ¸ nw. Now using the characterization of ~ n>n w
that says ¸u (~ n)=0together with equation (24), we establish




This, however, contradicts equation (26) above. QED
Special case: ° =0 For the case where ° =0we can derive the following
results:
Lemma 20 For given g<g ¤ (0);f(:);n 0,n1 and ° =0 , there exists a bench-
mark value ¹ b>0 such that
for b<¹ b we have R economy
for b>¹ b we have P economy
for b = ¹ b we have N economy with nw = n0
In other words, with ° =0it is the case that b = ¹ b in lemma 3.
Proof. Since the normal economy is the benchmark case in this result,
start by considering this economy. In the normal economy, everyone works who
does not a search subsidy: nz =^ n where v0 (x(^ n)) = v0 (b)= 1
^ n. Note that
this (x(^ n)=b)t o g e t h e rw i t h° =0implies that nw = n0.N o w w r i t e t h e
government budget constraint as
Z n1
^ n(b)
f (n)¹ s(n(v(x(n)) ¡ v(b)) ¡ x(n))dn +
Z ^ n(b)
n0
f (n)¹ s(¡x(^ n))dn =( 1¡ ¹ s)b + g
Note that the left hand side is decreasing in b because ^ n0 (b) > 0.F u r t h e rt h e
right hand side is increasing in b. Next by the assumption that g<g ¤ (0) we
see that for b =0the left hand side exceeds the right hand side. Further, if b
satis…es v0 (b)= 1
n1 we see that the left hand side is negative. Hence we have a
unique point ¹ b>0 where the equality above holds, namely a normal economy
with nw = n0. If we increase b above ¹ b we can no longer a¤ord such value of b
and we are in a poor economy. If b<¹ b we are in a rich economy.
37Lemma 21 Assume g<g ¤ (0);°=0and n0 ¸ 0 then the optimal b implies a
rich economy.
Proof. The assumption g<g ¤ (0) implies that with b =0the poor economy
can be ruled out. To prove the theorem we have to show that a normal economy
is impossible. We prove this by contradiction. Suppose that with optimal b we
are in a normal conomy. Then the following equalities hold:









where ¹ b is the benchmark value de…ned in the lemma above, the other equations
follow from the results on the normal economy. Substituting ¸E = v0 (b) in the
equation (11) for optimal b yields
v0 (b)=
1 ¡ ¹ s +¹ sF (^ n)
(1 ¡ ¹ s) 1
v0(b) +¹ s
R n1
^ n f (n) 1
v0(x(n))dn
Because v0 (x(n)) <v 0 (b) for n>^ n we have a contradiction. Hence a normal
economy is ruled out.
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Figure 1: zg(n,b) as a function of n.
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